Philosophy

Just like some bottles of chemicals, the word "Identity" has a sticker attached to it: "Danger: Handle with care". Never has there been another concept so likely to suddenly fan the flames and provoke not just arguments but full-on confrontations. And yet it does not, at first glance, appear toxic. Identity is everything that makes an entity definable and recognisable, in that it has a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other entities. In other words, identity is what makes two things one single thing – "identical" – or, conversely, makes them different. In social and ethno-anthropological sciences, the concept of identity is associated, first, with the way in which an individual sees themselves and moulds themselves as a member of a particular social group, nation, class, religion, ethnic group, gender, profession and so on, and second, with the way in which the norms that govern these groups allow the individual to think about themselves, situate themselves and relate to others, to the groups to which they belong and, by means which are sometimes more tortuous, to "external" groups, perceived as others. So why is it so noxious? Well, because it is understood according to different political formulas, different ideologies or "world views". Through a right-wing, conservative, populist or sovereigntist lens, identity will be defined as a coherent and cohesive set of shared norms that can be "objectively" determined and are rooted in longstanding tradition. A left-wing, more progressive approach, on the other hand, will offer a pluralist, fragmented concept of objective references which are used to differentiate individuals or sub-groups, and which must be valued and respected in an inclusive way: here, identities stem from the recognition of the unique features claimed by each individual or the emergence of shifting characteristics that play a prevailing role at any given time – profession or gender, religion or axiology, sports or ethnic group. Far from being singular and cemented in tradition as in the first case, in the second case identity will be variable: sometimes I’m a teacher, sometimes a person of mixed race, sometimes a footballer, sometimes a protestant, sometimes a shy person, sometimes a film buff, and so on.That said, there are many other ways of defining identity, depending on the field in question. In algebra, for example, it will be the equality between two expressions that is valid regardless of the values of the variables therein, for example: (x+y)2=x2+y2+2xy. In psychology, identity is one of the formal characteristics of the self, which feels its own sameness and continuity over time as the centre of its field of consciousness, in other words, the sense and awareness of one’s self as a separate and continuous entity (something that may be lost with some psychiatric disorders). And so on and so forth... Identity became a hot topic when the social sciences started to talk about collective identity as a response to, among other things, the re-emergence of ethnic conflict in many Western societies in the 1960s and 1970s, and the development, in the social arena, of movements based less on social class, as advocated by Marxism, but rather on, for example, differences between the generations or between the sexes. These demanded different approaches both to rationale behind common action and to new senses of belonging. It was then that opposition first emerged: in one camp, collective identity was understood as something immutable, "natural", eternal, that could be solidified by constructing myths and shared symbols, celebratory rituals and commemorations; in the other, it was seen as a cultural development, something contingent, a historical construction subject to change and "reformulation". Yet if identity refers to a "completeness", an internal "purity", it will imply withdrawal, protection, mistrust, borders and walls, the dismissal and sidelining of any otherness, any difference, the celebration of the self and the vilification of all others, the "enemies", experienced as a fatal threat, whose integration would break up the community of identicals. But if identity is neither "natural" nor substantial, but relational, if it has a non-native matrix, if it is made up of contributions, integrations, inclusions, often unpredictable inputs and hybridisations, then it will leave the group, community and society always open and welcoming, energised by the presence of all sides, no matter how different they may be.Robert Maggiori © Les Rencontres Philosophiques de Monaco (Monaco Philosophical Encounters)